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Political Power and Aid Tying Practices in the Development Assistance Committee Countries 
 
This paper examines on a panel of 22 OECD Development Assistance Committee 
countries whether fragmentation of executive power and the degree of competition in the 
legislative branch of government increases the amount of tied aid over the 1979-2009 
period. Fragmentation and competition are broadly defined as the degree to which the 
costs of a dollar of aid expenditure are internalized by decision makers and the relative 
strength of the government’s position vis-à-vis legislative composition respectively.  The 
empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as 
the number of decision makers within the government increases and decreases as the 
proportion of excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The allocation of foreign aid is influenced partly by the preferences, values, and domestic policies of 
donor countries (Noel and Therien 1995, Ruttan 1996, Feeny and McGillivray 2004, and Fleck and Kilby 
2006). Aid donors often face pressure from economic and political interest groups when determining the 
volume and allocation of aid (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2000 and Round and Odedokun 2004). 
Lobbying is common in the awarding of aid contracts since foreign aid is a lucrative business for many 
firms (ActionAid International 2005). Faced with these pressures, political leaders seek to improve their 
political position by strategic uses of aid (Hopkins 2000). 
 This paper empirically examines whether fragmentation of executive power and the degree of 
competition in the legislative branch of government increases the amount of tied aid commitments of 22 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries over the 1979-2009 period.
1
 Fragmentation is 
broadly defined as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aid expenditure are internalized by decision 
makers and is measured in two ways, the number of cabinet ministers and the number of political parties 
represented in the governing coalition. Competition is broadly defined as the relative strength of the 
government’s position vis-à-vis legislative composition and is also measured in two ways, the excess 
number of seats held by the governing coalition and the number of political parties with representation in 
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 The DAC has 24 members but the European Union was excluded because it is not a unified country and South 
Korea was excluded because it was not a DAC member until January 1, 2010. The DAC countries included are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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government. This analysis of the link between donor-political institutional features fits in the larger aid 
allocation literature, which documents that donor economic and political characteristics are important 
determinants of aid flows (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Burnside and Dollar 2000, and Radelet 2006), and 
extends this literature by documenting the role internal political factors have in influencing the type of aid 
allocated. The empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as 
the number of direct decision makers within the government increases and decreases as the proportion of 
excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.      
  The empirical analysis rests on two assumptions. First, government is not a single, benevolent, 
all-knowing actor. Instead, government is a coalition of political actors who respond to incentives and 
represent different factions. This assumption is important because most DAC countries are parliamentary 
democracies with varying degrees of government fragmentation and legislative competition, allowing 
individual government decision makers, political parties, and governing coalitions differing abilities in 
influencing aid allocation. 
 The second assumption is that aid allocation is similar to other budget allocations in that it is 
ultimately determined by government decision makers.
2
 Both of these assumptions are seen in the 
awarding of foreign aid contracts. These contracts are often awarded through the political process, 
providing business and interest groups the incentive to lobby for these profitable opportunities. Examples 
include Swedish exporters pressuring for more private sector involvement in the disbursement of Swedish 
foreign aid (ActionAid International 2005) and Archer Daniels Midland Corporation, a U.S. agribusiness 
company, lobbying against cuts in U.S. foreign aid (Morgan 1995). In an attempt to satisfy these external 
pressures, sometimes policymakers directly lobby on behalf of specific companies, such as Alabama 
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 Huber et al. (1993) and Noel and Therien (1995) highlight this point by arguing that foreign aid is the international 
equivalent of domestic social spending, spending which is driven by government decision makers. However, one 
significant way foreign aid differs from domestic budget allocations is that the beneficiaries and financiers of 
foreign aid live in different countries. This gap increases the likelihood policymakers will put domestic interests 
before foreign interests in aid allocation (Svensson 2006). 
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Senator Jeff Sessions pressing USAID, the official U.S. development agency, to order condoms from 
Alatech Healthcare, an Alabama condom maker (Dugger 2006).
3
         
 These real-world examples help illustrate theoretical models that document how the economic 
and political interests of interest groups and legislators affect aid allocation (McGillivray and Oczkowski 
1992, Murshed and Sen 1995, Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2000, and Villanger 2004). McGillivray and 
Oczkowski (1992) model British bilateral aid and find that aid eligibility and allocation decisions are 
based on the humanitarian, commercial, and political interests of Britain in the developing countries. 
Murshed and Sen (1995) develop a principal-agent model showing how competing interest groups lobby 
aid agencies.  Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (2000) construct a political-economic model of foreign aid 
allocation illustrating how donor governments accept political contributions from ethnic lobby groups and 
then directs aid to the ethnic lobbying groups’ country or countries of choice. Villanger (2004) builds a 
‘triadic’ model where donors weigh competing companies’ relationships with aid recipients and then 
decide how to disburse aid. In addition, Svensson (2000) describes how aid policy, like other economic 
policies, is determined by competing social groups and shows that the expectation of aid may encourage 
rent dissipation, and Therien (2002), Fleck and Kilby (2006), and Milner and Tingley (2009) examine 
how donor countries’ ideologies influence aid flows.   
 The theoretical rationale supporting the paper’s two main assumptions follows from the political 
economy government fragmentation literature of Roubini and Sachs (1989) and the ‘common pool 
problem’ literature of Weingast et al. (1981) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981). Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
and the literature that follows emphasize how political competition through government fragmentation 
explains public sector expenditures. In general, this research finds that broad government coalitions are 
more susceptible to political pressure than one-party, majoritarian governments. The literature following 
Weingast et al. (1981) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981) describe the relationship between the number of 
decision makers and government expenditures. Individual groups, and indirectly the government decision 
                                                          
3
 Senator Sessions has received direct campaign contributions from employees of Alatech Healthcare. 
http://www.opensecrets.org/index.php  
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makers who represent their interests in formulating public policy, benefit from targeted expenditures 
while the cost of those expenditures fall on a widespread population. More formally, whereas the 
individual groups fully internalize the benefits of additional expenditures, they only internalize a fraction 
of 1/n of the costs. Therefore, expenditures increase as the number of n groups and their representatives 
increase. 
 The question remains how the fragmented government and ‘common pool problem’ literature 
relate to the hypothesis that the type of aid allocated is influenced by internal government fragmentation 
and the relative strength of competition of government participants. Specifically, why would the nominal 
value of tied aid increase with greater government fragmentation and greater competition since tied aid, 
like other budgetary appropriations, will have supporters (i.e. industry and agriculture) and detractors (i.e. 
development non-governmental organization [NGO’s])? The Special Interest Effect of Public-choice 
analysis provides insight into this question. The Special Interest Effect states that organized, concentrated, 
and well-informed interest groups are able to effectively lobby policymakers. While development NGO’s 
fit this description just as well as domestic industry and agricultural interest groups, the benefits of 
untying aid are widespread and distant (i.e. in developing countries) while the costs of untying aid are 
concentrated and local (i.e. the loss of losing a tied aid contract could affect a specific industry in a 
specific voting district). Therefore, policymakers, who are motivated by incentives, may be more inclined 
to listen to interest groups that are pro-tied aid rather than anti-tied aid. 
 This paper follows the research of Round and Odedokun (2004), Faini (2006), and Bertoli et al. 
(2008). These papers test the determinants of aid supply and find that political and economic 
characteristics of the aid country matter for aid allocation. While Faini (2006) and Bertoli et al. (2008) 
test how the political ideology of governing coalitions affects aid supply, Round and Odedokun (2004) 
test whether a greater lack of cohesion within governments leads to a greater need to make more 
budgetary allocations for aid, making it the most relevant paper to the current study. They hypothesize 
that the greater the opposition a governing party faces, the higher the aid effort (i.e. the more aid is used 
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to satisfy “the different veto wielding interest”). Their empirical results show that the larger the number of 
parties forming the governing coalition, the higher the aid effort and as the number of parties forming the 
opposition increases, the easier it is for the government to ignore the opposition when allocating aid.  
 This paper differs from Round and Odedokun (2004) in two ways. First, whereas Round and 
Odedokun test whether government fragmentation affects how much aid is allocated, this study tests 
whether government fragmentation influences the type of aid allocated. This paper also differs from 
Round and Odedokun by providing more precise definitions of government fragmentation in line with 
Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), two extensions of Roubini and Sachs 
(1989). These changes allow for a deeper picture of how donor-political institutional features influence 
the aid allocation process.    
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides a brief discussion of tied aid. Section three 
describes the data and introduces the empirical specifications. Section four presents the basic econometric 
results and provides interpretation. Section five considers some sensitivity analyses and section six 
tenders concluding remarks. 
 
II. Tied Aid 
   Aid tying, or the restrictions placed by donors on recipients for how aid may be used, has become 
abeunt studia in mores among DAC members, the largest donors of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA).
4
  The amount of tied aid was 35 percent higher in 2009 than 1979 despite criticism from the aid 
community, suggesting donors receive utility from tied aid (Gounder 1999).
5
 Donors’ penchant for tied 
aid is not surprising considering tied aid’s long history. Kanbur (2006) reports that tied aid was a key 
feature of both British and American foreign aid programs from the beginning of the modern aid 
movement (late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century).   
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 Since 1960, DAC countries have given 74.5 percent of total ODA.  
5
 The 1969 Pearson Commission and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness are two examples. 
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 The aid literature generally cites commercial, political, and security reasons for why donors tie 
aid. Commercial reasons include stimulating employment, bolstering exports, and improving balance of 
payments problems (Jepma 1991). Political reasons include satisfying strong lobbying groups (Lahiri and 
Raimondos-Moller 2000) and reforming the internal governing of aid recipients (World Bank 1998 and 
Hermes and Lensink 2001). Security reasons involve expanding foreign policy influence (Zimmerman 
1993 and Schraeder et al. 1998) and fighting terrorism (Harrigan et al. 2006).  In addition, tied aid 
increases public support for aid in donor countries (Senanayake 2010) and helps overcome unreliable 
local suppliers, weak legal systems, and poor infrastructure in recipient countries (Melito 2009). 
 The success of using tied aid in meeting the commercial and political designs of donors is mixed. 
Wagner (2003) and Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2008) show aid flows have a positive impact on donor 
exports but Tajoli (1999) finds that a donor’s export shares are not correlated to the degree of aid tying 
and that tied aid may be important to the exports of individual firms and sectors only, not to a country as a 
whole. Osei et al. (2004) find the real impact of tying on donors’ exports is limited. Jepma (1991) and 
Clay et al. (2008) find no evidence that tied aid substantially increases donor country employment or 
significantly impacts a donor country’s balance of payments, most likely because tied aid represents a 
small percentage of donor countries’ exports. While Sowa and White (1997) argue “well-designed and 
effectively managed” tied aid could be efficient, particularly if the recipient would not receive aid 
otherwise, this is unlikely since aid distribution is mired in “a sea of bureaucracy” that suppresses critical 
feedback and prevents the “identification of the best channel of resources for different objectives” 
(Easterly 2002).  
 Tied aid enables donors to prioritize their own commercial and political concerns above recipient 
interests, reduces the real worth of aid, and results in welfare losses for recipients when compared to 
unrestricted aid transfers (Osei 2003, Quartey 2005, and Clay et al. 2008). Jepma (1991) estimates that 
tied aid increases the direct cost to aid recipients by an average of 15 to 30 percent while the excess costs 
of tying aid in the form of technical assistance or food aid is even higher (Williams et al. 2003 and Barrett 
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and Maxwell 2005). Baffour (2004) finds a significant mark-up on the prices of tied aid imports 
compared to the prices of non-aid imports. Tied aid can undermine local institutional capacity (Aryeetey 
et al. 2003) and encourage recipients to have a ‘lack of ownership’ attitude towards aid (Clay et al. 2008). 
 Tied aid is more common in countries that use aid to promote their own objectives. Australia, 
Canada, France, and the United States tie a larger proportion of their aid budget than the DAC average. In 
contrast, the Nordic countries of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, often considered in the aid literature as 
more altruistic, development-friendly, and less geostrategically-inclined, tie a smaller proportion of their 
aid than the DAC average (Hendra 1987 and Gates and Hoeffler 2004). 
 
III. Data and Estimation 
The paper uses a panel of 22 DAC countries from 1979 to 2009.  Data is unavailable for each variable in 
every year so the number of observations in each regression depends on the choice of explanatory 
variables. Appendix 1 includes a detailed variable description and summary statistics. The basic 
specification of the empirical model is:  
 Tied Aidi,t = αi + β1 Total Aidi,t + β2 Politicali,t  + β3Growthi,t + β4Tradei,t + ηt + εit   (1) 
where i and t are the country and year indices, respectively, αi represents country fixed effects, and  ηt 
represents time effects. The paper uses Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimations. Fixed 
country effects are included as specified by the Hausman test. Time effects are included because the null 
hypothesis that all year coefficients are jointly equal to zero was rejected. Clustered standard errors at the 
country level are used to reduce idiosyncratic disturbances across countries through time. 
 The dependent variable (Tied Aid) is total bilateral ODA commitments tied in constant 2008 
USD millions.
6
 The explanatory variables are broken into economic and political groupings. The 
economic variables (Total Aid, GDP per capita, Population, and Trade) are included as measurements 
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 Bilateral aid is used because aid is fungible (Boone 1996) and multilateral aid is difficult to tie. Therefore, bilateral 
aid is easier for the donor to control.  
8 
 
capturing the reaction function of policymakers.
7
 Total Aid is total bilateral ODA commitments in 
constant 2008 USD millions and is included because Total Aid and Tied Aid are positively correlated in a 
statistically significant way.
8
 Donor GDP per capita is included because there is an “existence of 
progressivity of aid in relation to donor income” (Round and Odedokun 2004) and aid is a superior good 
that increases in relation to donor income (Bertoli et al. 2008).  Population is the total population of a 
country and is included because Round and Odedokun (2004) and Bertoli et al. (2008) find the fraction of 
income given as aid is inversely related to the population of the donors. Trade is the sum of exports and 
imports divided by GDP and is included because countries may give tied aid to improve their trade 
balance (Jepma 1991). 
 The political explanatory variables follow the variables of government fragmentation and the 
degree of competition in the legislative branch as used by Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002). While some of the political variables are highly correlated, they each provide a more 
nuanced definition of government fragmentation and legislative competition. The correlation results are 
available upon request as is the data variation of the political variables by country. 
  Fragmentation of the executive power represents the number of decision makers and is measured 
in two ways. First, the number of cabinet ministers (Spending Ministers) is employed as a direct measure 
of decision makers. Policy is ultimately decided by ministers within the cabinet (Perotti and Kontopoulos 
2002) and these ministers represent constituencies that benefit directly from budget expenditures. These 
ministers act as individual units with their own influence and demands on the budget process. Spending 
Ministers is calculated as the number of full ministers in government at the end of each year, excluding 
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 As a robustness check, Percentage Tied Aid is used as the dependent variable so Total Aid is dropped as an 
independent variable. Percentage Tied Aid is total bilateral ODA commitments tied divided by total bilateral ODA 
commitments.  
8
 Commitments rather than disbursements are used for three reasons. First, disbursements and commitments are 
highly correlated and estimation results are unlikely to be affected (Neumayer 2003). Second, donors have complete 
control of commitments (Berthelemy and Tichit 2004). Lastly, the data availability of commitments is greater than 
disbursements. 
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the ministers of finance/budget or prime ministers because in theory they represent the “average” taxpayer 
instead of individual groups (Alesina and Perotti 1999).  
 The number of decision makers could also correspond to the number of political parties 
represented in the governing coalition since political parties are cohesive units representing the interests 
of specific groups. Two variables are used to measure this more indirect measurement of decision makers. 
The first is a count of the number of political parties with representation in the governing coalition 
(Coalition Parties). However, since Coalition Parties does not consider the size of the political parties, the 
effective number of political parties in the governing coalition, or Effective Coalition Parties, is 
employed. This variable is defined as: 
  Effective Coalition Parties = 1 / i
2      
(2)  
where pi denotes the share of ministers from party i as a proportion of the total number of ministers and n 
is the number of coalition parties. This variable is the inverse of a Herfindahl-index, which has been used 
in political economy studies (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). 
 Three variables are considered to measure the degree of competition in the legislative branch. The 
first is the excess number of seats (Excess Seats) held by the governing coalition and is defined as the 
number of seats above those needed for a simple majority, scaled to the number of seats needed for a 
simple majority:
9
   
  Excess Seats = (# of seats above simple majority) / (simple majority)  (3) 
The second is the number of political parties with representation in government (Represented Parties). A 
political party has representation in government if it has a voting member in the legislative branch. The 
more political parties with representation in government, the more difficult it is for opposing parties to 
form a united front against the governing coalition (Volkerink and De Haan 2001). Like Coalition Parties, 
Represented Parties does not consider the size of the various parties in the governing coalition so the 
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 ES is not collected for the United States because the bicameral system makes it difficult to determine the excess 
number of seats if the legislative chambers are controlled by different parties. 
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effective number of parties in the legislative branch (Effective Represented Parties) is used. The variable 
is defined as: 
  Effective Represented Parties = 1 / i
2      
(4) 
where pi denotes the share of ministers from party i as a proportion of the total number of ministers and n 
is the number of parties in the legislative branch.  
 
IV. Results for the basic model 
This paper follows previous literature where the effects of fragmentation of the executive power and the 
degree of competition in the legislative branch of government are estimated separately. The first model 
analyzes fragmentation of the executive power with Coalition Parties and Effective Coalition Parties 
included in columns 1 and 2 respectively (Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1] 
 The coefficient for Spending Ministers is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in both 
specifications while neither the coefficient for Coalition Parties or Effective Coalition Parties is 
statistically significant at standard levels of significance, though they exhibit the expected positive sign. 
One additional spending minister increases tied aid between $116.62 and $119.89 million, a 12.5 and 12.8 
percent increase from the mean value of tied aid. The positive coefficient for Spending Ministers provides 
evidence that as the number of policymakers with direct decision making abilities increases, the more aid 
is tied. Since spending ministers act as an individual unit bringing their own demands or indirectly the 
demands of their constituencies to the overall spending demands of the executive branch, tied aid may be 
used as a way to satisfy or reward strategic constituencies with strong political interests. As noted above, 
aid contracts are a lucrative business. In contrast, the statistical insignificance of the political party 
variables suggests that more direct decision making abilities may be more important than indirect 
influence through the political party apparatus. These results are broadly in line with Round and 
Odedokun (2004) who find the more fragmented a government is the more aid is used to buy political 
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support. The results also support the findings of Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) who find that greater government fragmentation affects fiscal policy outcomes, of 
which aid is a part. 
       The second model analyzes the impact the degree of competition in the legislative branch of 
government has on the composition of aid allocation, with Represented Parties and Effective Represented 
Parties included in columns 1 and 2 respectively (Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2] 
 The coefficient for Excess Seats is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when Represented 
Parties is included and at the 10 percent level when Effective Represented Parties is included. A one 
percent increase in the proportion of excess seats above the simple majority decreases tied aid between 
$5.36 and $6.82 million, a 0.57 to 0.73 percent decrease from the mean value of tied aid. The negative 
coefficient suggests that as the excess number of seats above the simple majority increases, a governing 
coalition can afford to “lose” some votes and still maintain its political power, reducing the incentive to 
“buy” votes with tied aid. Again, this result is broadly in line with Round and Odedokun (2004) who 
suggest the smaller a threat the opposition is to the governing coalition “the easier it seems for the 
government to ignore the interest of the opposition” in aid allocation.  The statistical insignificance of the 
political party variables (Represented Parties and Effective Represented Parties) again suggests that 
influencing specific decision makers, in this case the competition over specific legislative seats, may be 
more important than working through political parties since many political parties must balance broader 
agendas than specific legislative decision makers.  
 On average, a one percent increase in the proportion of excess seats above the simple majority 
translates to about 1.5 additional seats for the government in power.
10
 While losing one seat may not be a 
large swing for a ruling government (the average number of seats above the simple majority in the dataset 
is 17), from a practical perspective, it doesn’t take much in the way of changing seats to make a large 
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 For the dataset, the average number of seats that constitute a simple majority is 148. Therefore, an increase of 1.48 
seats will increase the proportion of excess seats by 1 percent.     
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impact on the amount of aid tied. For a lobbyist, changing just 2 seats can mean the difference in 
obtaining or losing an additional $5 to $7 million aid contract.  
 Following Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) who suggest that governments with different political 
or institutional characteristics react differently to changes in economic variables, the basic empirical 
specification is re-tested with the political variables of interest interacted with GDP per capita since the 
amount of aid is influenced by the wealth of the donor country (see above). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 
show the results for fragmentation of the executive power, with Coalition Parties included in column 3 
and Effective Coalition Parties included in column 4. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show the results for the 
degree of competition in the legislative branch of government, with Represented Parties included in 
column 3 and Effective Represented Parties included in column 4.  
 Including the interaction terms confirms the basic results. The coefficient for Spending Ministers 
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level when Coalition Parties is included and at the 1 percent 
level when Effective Coalition Parties is included. The coefficients remain the expected positive sign and 
one additional spending minister increases tied aid between $99.59 and $104.32 million, a 10.6 and 11.1 
percent increase from the mean value of tied aid.
11
 The coefficient for Excess Seats is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level when Represented Parties is included and at the 10 percent level when 
Effective Represented Parties is included. The coefficients remain the expected negative sign and a one 
percent increase in the proportion of excess seats above the simple majority decreases tied aid between 
$5.45 and $5.80 million, a 0.58 to 0.62 percent decrease from the mean value of tied aid. Coalition 
Parties, Effective Coalition Parties, Represented Parties and Effective Represented Parties are again not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.   
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 Following Wooldridge (2006), the political variables are evaluated at the mean value of GDP per capita, a more 
meaningful value of GDP per capita than zero. Therefore, the coefficients in the text require an adjustment from the 
coefficients in the tables. For example, to calculate the $99.59 million value of Spending Ministers in the text, the 
coefficient of Spending Ministers*GDP per capita is multiplied by the mean value of GDP per capita and added to 
the coefficient of Spending Ministers. Before the coefficients are rounded in the tables, (-0.0047037 x 27343) + 
(228.21) = 99.59. 
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V. Sensitivity Analyses 
This section includes three sensitivity tests. The first sensitivity test uses Percentage Tied Aid as a 
dependent variable instead of Tied Aid since the increase in tied aid may only be a result of an increase in 
overall aid.  The second sensitivity test evaluates the standard model and the model with Percentage Tied 
Aid with all of the basic political variables included. The last sensitivity test collapses the yearly panel 
into five-year averages to analyze longer term trends and smooth out business cycles and international 
shocks, which may affect aid allocation. The general results confirm that as fragmentation in the 
executive branch increases, tied aid increases and as the degree of competition in the legislative branch 
decreases, tied aid decreases.  
 The first sensitivity test uses Percentage Aid as the dependent variable instead of Tied Aid. The 
first model analyzes fragmentation of the executive power, with columns 1 and 3 including Coalition 
Parties and columns 2 and 4 including Effective Coalition Parties (Table 3). 
[Insert Table 3] 
  The results confirm the positive and statistically significant coefficients for Spending Ministers 
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all specifications) while the coefficients for Coalition 
Parties or Effective Coalitions Parties are never statistically significant at standard levels of significance. 
Before the political variables are interacted with GDP per capita (columns 1 and 2), one additional 
spending minister increases the percentage of tied aid between 1.70 and 1.72 percent, a 5.27 to 5.31 
increase from the mean value of percentage tied aid.  When the interaction variables are included 
(columns 3 and 4), one additional spending minister increases the percentage of tied aid between 1.52 and 
1.60 percent, a 4.72 to 4.94 increase from the mean value of percentage tied aid.  
 The second model analyzes the degree of competition in the legislative branch of government, 
with columns 1 and 3 including Represented Parties and columns 2 and 4 including Effective Represented 
Parties (Table 4). 
[Insert Table 4] 
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 The coefficient for Excess Seats is negative and statistically significant in all specifications while 
the coefficients for the political party variables are never statistically significant. Before the political 
variables are interacted with GDP per capita (columns 1 and 2), a one percent increase in the proportion 
of excess seats above the simple majority decreases tied aid between 16.89 and 19.79 percent. When the 
interaction variables are included (columns 3 and 4), a one percent increase in the proportion of excess 
seats above the simple majority decreases tied aid between 16.67 and 20.47 percent.  
 The second sensitivity test analyzes whether the basic results are changed when all of the basic 
political variables are included, with Tied Aid as the dependent variable in column 1 and Percentage Tied 
Aid as the dependent variable in column 2 (Table 5). 
[Insert Table 5] 
 The inclusion of the basic political variables does not change the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of Spending Ministers or the negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
Excess Seats in either specification. The magnitude of these coefficients also aligns with the previous 
results. However, with the inclusion of all the political variables, the coefficient for Coalition Parties is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the coefficient for Represented Parties is 
negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level when Tied Aid is the dependent variable. The 
positive coefficient for Coalition Parties suggests that a government with more constituencies to satisfy 
may tie more aid than a government with less constituency pressure, perhaps as a way to protect its own 
political power since losing a coalition partner may mean a loss of political power. The negative 
coefficient for Represented Parties supports Round and Odedokun’s (2004) findings that the more 
fragmented the opposition is, the easier it is for the ruling government to ignore the opposition in aid 
allocation. However, the results for the political party variables should be viewed with caution since their 
coefficients are statistically insignificant when Percentage Tied Aid is the dependent variable.   
 The last sensitivity test analyzes long term trends in changes to tied aid, with the fragmentation of 
the executive power analyzed in columns 1 and 2, the degree of competition in the legislative branch 
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evaluated in columns 3 and 4, and the results when all the basic political variables are included revealed 
in column 5 (Table 6).
12
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 The results of the longer term trends are not much different than the standard results for the 
fragmentation of the executive power. The coefficients for Spending Ministers are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level for each specification. The results for the degree of 
competition in the legislative branch are somewhat different. While the coefficients for Excess Seats are 
the expected negative sign, Excess Seats is only statistically significant when all political variables are 
included. The statistical insignificance of Excess Seats in the other specifications may suggest that 
individual legislative seats are not as important in the long run for aid allocation decisions. Perhaps over a 
longer time period, influencing cabinet ministers may be more important to lobbyists if they view the 
direct decision makers within government coalitions as more stable than individual legislative seats, 
helping to explain the results for Spending Ministers and Excess Seats. It is also possible that since aid 
contracts are likely to be multi-year contracts, once an aid contract is secured, individual legislators 
become less important than direct decision makers in the executive branch. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
Tying bilateral aid is common, despite its questionable value to donor and recipient.  This paper examines 
the link between donor-political institutional features and tied aid and extends the foreign aid literature by 
documenting the role domestic political factors have in influencing the composition of a country’s aid 
budget. The institutional factors considered are the fragmentation of the executive power and the degree 
of competition in the legislative branch. 
 The empirical results of the model measuring the fragmentation of the executive power show that 
as the number of direct decision makers within the government coalition increases, as measured by the 
                                                          
12
 The year 1979 was dropped because it contained the fewest observations. Keeping 1979 and dropping 2009 did 
not alter the results. 
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number of spending ministers, the more aid is tied, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid. The 
model measuring the degree of competition in the legislative branch shows a more comfortable margin of 
power, as measured by the excess number of seats held by the governing coalition above the simple 
majority, decreases the amount of aid tied, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid. The results are 
robust when the basic models are extended to account for how policymakers react to changes in economic 
variables and when longer time trends are considered. These results suggest that aid is used for political 
self-interest and that reducing tied aid, when compared to political security, is of second order importance 
to government decision makers. 
 The empirical results are not surprising since aid is allocated through a political process filled 
with self-interested decision makers, political pressure and rent seeking are realities in aid allocation 
decisions, and donors have a long history of giving tied aid. While these realities make it difficult for 
practical aid reform, such as the elimination of tied aid, two political reforms are possible that could 
reduce tied aid.  The first reform is a limitation on the number of spending ministers, since the empirical 
results show tied aid increases as the number of spending ministers increases. As noted by Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002), the number of spending ministers is usually not fixed in a country’s constitution so 
reducing the number of spending ministers is easier than changing other political characteristics.  
 A second and perhaps more easily implemented reform is the setting of clear and public 
benchmarks that must be met before aid is tied.  These benchmarks must be binding and credible because 
such a reform will encounter resistance. These benchmarks would place the burden of proof to tie aid on 
interest groups and sympathetic legislators, to justify the practice publicly rather than privately, increasing 
public accountability. Such a reform may change the incentives of aid donors at the margin from 
satisfying their own political considerations to addressing the true needs of aid recipients. If donors are 
truly serious about using aid to promote economic growth and social development in recipient countries, 
such reforms should be welcomed.
17 
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Variable 1 2 3 4
Total Aid 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18
(0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)**
Spending Ministers 116.62 119.89 228.21 237.01
(40.28)*** (41.87)*** (71.05)*** (71.24)***
Coalition Parties 102.11 143.93
(65.03) (222.21)
Effective Coalition Parties 62.65 -72.79
(96.79) (250.04)
GDP Per Capita 0.005 0.007 0.09 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)* (0.04)*
Trade 10.93 10.24 7.79 7.01
(8.41) (8.78) (7.88) (7.97)
Population -30.00 -31.60 -32.60 -32.10
(16.8)* (17.20)* (16.5)* (17.30)*
Spending Ministers*Growth -0.005 -0.005
(0.002)** (0.002)**
Coalition Parties*Growth -0.002
(0.007)
Effective Coalition Parties*Growth 0.005
(0.008)
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
Number of observations 531 531 531 531
R-squared (within) 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
Table 1: Fragmentation of the Executive Power
Notes: The dependent variable is Tied Aid. The regressions cover years 1979 - 2009 and include 
country fixed effects and year dummies. The set of regressors also includes a constant term. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and 
* = 10% significance level  
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Variable 1 2 3 4
Total Aid 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.25
(0.09)** (0.09)** (0.09)*** (0.09)**
Excess Seats -6.82 -5.36 -5.52 -3.92
(3.07)** (3.11)* (8.87) (7.28)
Represented Parties -33.97 179.67
(47.27) (97.91)*
Effective Represented Parties 125.23 338.32
(86.43) (226.21)
GDP Per Capita -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Trade 3.80 4.37 1.93 4.38
(6.22) (6.27) (5.67) (6.53)
Population -26.97 -26.33 -28.55 -28.71
(7.14)*** (7.55)*** (6.79)*** (8.34)***
Excess Seats*Growth -0.001 -0.006
(0.03) (0.02)
Represented Parties*Growth -0.009
(0.004)
Effective Represented Parties*Growth -0.008
(0.008)
Number of countries 510 510 510 510
Number of observations 21 21 21 21
R-squared (within) 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.61
Table 2: Competition in the Legislative Branch
Notes: The dependent variable is Tied Aid. The regressions cover years 1979 - 2009 and include 
country fixed effects and year dummies. The set of regressors also includes a constant term. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and 
* = 10% significance level  
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Variable 1 2 3 4
Spending Ministers 1.70 1.72 3.21 3.16
(0.47)*** (0.45)*** (1.95) (2.01)
Coalition Parties -0.39 -4.12
(1.07) (4.76)
Effective Coalition Parties -1.21 -2.29
(2.16) (7.91)
GDP Per Capita 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17)
Population 0.009 0.009 0.10 0.08
(0.014) (0.014) (0.15) (0.17)
Spending Ministers*Growth -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Coalition Parties*Growth 0.0001
(0.0002)
Effective Coalition Parties*Growth 0.0005
(0.0009)
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
Number of observations 531 531 531 531
R-squared (within) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Table 3: Fragmentation of the Executive Power with Percentage Aid
Notes: The dependent variable is Percentage Tied Aid. The regressions cover years 1979 - 2009 and 
include country fixed effects and year dummies. The set of regressors also includes a constant term. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** - 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% 
significance level  
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Variable 1 2 3 4
Excess Seats -16.89 -19.79 -52.67 -48.62
(8.62)* (9.08)** (22.53)** (25.39)*
Represented Parties 0.47 3.47
(0.93) (3.39)
Effective Represented Parties -2.66 -0.24
(2.62) (8.15)
GDP Per Capita 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade 0.06 0.05 0.009 0.03
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Population -1.46 -1.63 -1.84 -1.96
(1.18) (1.12) (1.13) (1.33)
Excess Seats*Growth 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Represented Parties*Growth -0.001
(0.001)
Effective Represented Parties*Growth -0.0001
(0.0003)
Number of countries 21 21 21 21
Number of observations 510 510 510 510
R-squared (within) 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51
Table 4: Competition in the Legislative Branch with Percentage Aid
Notes: The dependent variable is Percentage Tied Aid.The regressions cover years 1979 - 2009 and 
include counry fixed effects and year dummies. The set of regressors also includes a constant term. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% 
significance level  
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Variable 1 2
Total Aid 0.22
(0.08)***
Spending Ministers 119.68 1.73
(25.49)*** (0.55)***
Coalition Parties 87.17 -0.43
(37.27)** (1.09)
Excess Seats -8.81 -18.61
(3.26)** (8.61)**
Represented Parties -69.61 0.18
(33.78)* (1.02)
GDP Per Capita -0.02 0.001
(0.02) -0.001
Trade 5.01 0.06
(4.85) (0.20)
Population -260.10 -1.57
(52.20)*** (1.36)
Number of countries 21 21
Number of observations 510 510
R-squared (within) 0.67 0.52
Table 5: All Political Variables
Notes: The dependent variable in Column 1 is Tied Aid and Percentage Aid in 
Column 2. Columns 1 and 2 use the yearly panel and cover the years 1979 - 2009. 
All regressions include country fixed effects and year dummies. The set of 
regressors also includes a constant term. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level are included in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% 
significance level  
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Total Aid 0.14 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.23
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12)** (0.13)** (0.09)**
Spending Ministers 193.01 208.66 196.48
(63.79)*** (70.88)*** (45.24)***
Coalition Parties 224.71 128.18
(107.09)** (91.87)
Effective Coalition Parties 134.68
(187.08)
Excess Seats -8.77 -6.31 -8.77
(5.56) (6.19) (4.55)*
Represented Parties -71.44 -118.91
(79.52) (54.66)**
Effective Represented Parties 143.83
(140.51)
GDP Per Capita -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Trade 6.49 4.93 6.51 7.58 2.41
(7.45) (8.07) (4.92) (5.09) (3.63)
Population -15.00 -18.90 -26.50 -26.28 -25.83
(16.90) (16.90) (7.01)*** (7.83)*** (5.42)***
Number of countries 22 22 21 21 21
Number of observations 116 116 111 111 111
R-squared (within) 0.53 0.5 0.63 0.63 0.72
Table 6: Five Year Averages
Notes: The dependent variable is Tied Aid. The yearly panel is collapsed into 5 year averages. The regressions cover years 
1980 - 2009 and include country fixed effects and year dummies. The set of regressors also includes a constant term. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10% significance 
level  
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Appendix 1 
Variable Description Source
Tied Aid*
Total bilateral Official Development Assistance commitments tied (constant 2008 USD 
millions, i.e. 14 = $14 million).
OECD's online database (DAC Table 7b 
Tying Status of Bilateral ODA) and Irish 
Aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade
Total Aid
Total bilateral Official Development Assistance commitments (constant 2008 USD millions, 
i.e. 14 = $14 million).
OECD's online database (DAC Table 7b 
Tying Status of Bilateral ODA)
Percentage 
Tied Aid
Total bilateral Official Development Assistance commitments tied divided by total bilateral 
Official Development Assistance commitments (measured as a percentage).
OEDD's online database (DAC Table 7b 
Tying Status of Bilateral ODA) and 
author calculation
Spending 
Ministers
Number of full ministers in the governing coalition (i.e. the cabinet) at the end of each year, 
excluding the ministers of finance/budget (measured in levels, i.e. 1 minister = 1).
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions)
Coalition 
Parties
Number of political parties represented in the governing coalition (measured in levels, i.e. 1 
party = 1).
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions)
Effective 
Coalition 
Parties
The effective number of political parties in the governing coalition, measured as the inverse 
of the share of spending ministers from party i  as a proportion of the total number of 
spending ministers in the cabinet. For example, if a cabinet has 10 members, 5 from party A 
and 5 from party B, Effective Coalition Parties = 1 / [(.5)^2 + (.5)^2] = 2.
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions) and author calculation
Excess Seats
The number of seats above the simple majority divided by the the simple majority (measured 
as a percentage). For example, if a parliament has 100 seats, the simple majority is 51. If 
party X has 53 seats, Excess Seats = 3.92%.
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions) and author calculation
Represented 
Parties
Number of political parties with representation in government (i.e. holds a voting seat in the 
legislative branch), measured in levels ( i.e. 1 party = 1).
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions)
Effective 
Represented 
Parties
The effective number of political parties with representation in government, measured as the 
inverse of the share of legislators from party i  as a proportion of the total number of 
legislators in the legislative branch. For example, if a parliment has 100 members, 45 from 
party A and 55 from party B, Effective Represented Parties = 1 / [(.45)^2 + (.55)^2] = 1.98.
Europa World Year Book (various 
editions) and author calculation
GDP Per 
Capita
Gross Domestic Product divided by population (costant 2008 USD).
World Development Indicators: World 
Bank
Population
The total population of a country is based on the de facto definition of population, counting 
all residents regardless of legal status of citizenship, except for refugees not permanantly 
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their 
country of origin, measured in millions (i.e. 14 = 14 million). 
World Development Indicators: World 
Bank
Trade
The sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by Gross Domestic 
Products (measured as a percentage).
World Development Indicators: World 
Bank
* The OECD does not include administrative costs and technical cooperation in the aggregate tied aid figures.
Table 7: Variable Description and Sources
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
Tied Aid 936.84 1682.77 0 9597.18 534
Total Aid 3084.7 4644.02 29.93 32734.13 556
Percentage Total Aid 32.39 27.52 0 100 534
Spending Ministers 15.62 4.39 5 31 682
Coalition Parties 2.32 1.45 1 8 682
Effective Coalition Parties 1.92 1.08 1 6.31 682
Excess Seats 11.59 21.55 -49.39 71.29 651
Represented Parties 7.33 3.12 2 19 682
Effective Represented Parties 3.52 1.42 1.69 9.05 682
GDP Per Capita 27343.63 10914.58 7859.21 70798.34 680
Population 37.4 58.5 0.03 307 682
Trade 73.84 46.74 16.01 326.76 681
Note: Percentage Total Aid, Excess seats, Growth, and Trade are in percentages (i.e. 71.29 = 71.29%)
Table 8: Summary Statistics
 
 
